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Single Idea 4087

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality ]

Full Idea

Intentionalism (the doctrine that all mental states are intentional) need not be the thesis that all mental states are propositional attitudes.

Clarification

Propositional attitudes are attitudes to proposiions, like believing or hoping it is raining

Gist of Idea

Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes

Source

Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.22)

Book Ref

Crane,Tim: 'Elements of Mind' [OUP 2001], p.74

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A Reaction

This points to the requirement for an intentionalist to prove that so-called 'qualia' states are essentially intentional, which is not implausible.